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FOREWORD

War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in
American national security policy and alters strategic
balances and relationships around the world. The specific
effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In
some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it
may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.
To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled
Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the
author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position
that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military
action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after
the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the
region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with
Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.
This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is
pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and
Department of Defense in crafting the most effective
strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of
war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT
WITH IRAQ: SOUTH ASIA

Conclusions:

·

India and Pakistan, the major countries of South Asia,
have distanced themselves from the proposed U.S.-led
military action in Iraq. Both countries remain concerned
that a prolonged war would affect their domestic security
situation and their economies adversely.

·

The war will not change either country’s long-term
relationship with the United States. They see the United
States as an important strategic and economic partner.

·

India and Pakistan will continue to provide strong
support in the war on terrorism. Increased security
cooperation is taking place with India.

· India, especially, could be a partner in the post-war
reconstruction of Iraq’s economy, its civil society, and its
military.
Background.
India and Pakistan have shied away from President
Bush’s call for a military effort to change the regime in
Baghdad. India’s official position was given in a joint
statement during the official visit of Russian President
Vladimir Putin to New Delhi in December 2002. The two
governments agreed that:
Both sides strongly opposed the unilateral use or threat of use
of force in violation of the UN charter as well as interference in
internal affairs of other states . . . [Further,] it was stressed [in
their talks] that the comprehensive settlement of the situation
around Iraq is possible only through political and diplomatic
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efforts in strict conformity with the rules of international law
only under the aegis of the United Nations. . . .1

For Pakistan, being an American ally in the war on
terror has placed some domestic pressure on the Musharraf
government. This makes Islamabad reluctant to participate
in another military operation that is viewed as being
anti-Muslim in its orientation.2 Leaders of the Islamic
fundamentalist party, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),
that has formed provincial governments in Balochistan and
the crucial, to the war on terror, North West Frontier
Province, made it clear that, if General Musharraf followed
the American policy line, they would not allow the
government to function. More importantly, MMA ministers
have begun to call for a revival of the Taliban and resistance
to the Karzai government in Kabul. The ministers have also
said that they will use force to oppose the operations of the
FBI and American forces on Pakistani soil.3
Added to the anger of the Islamic groups is a broad public
movement against U.S. policy in Iraq that could be used to
help launch an agitation against the Musharraf regime.
Pro-democracy forces in the country may use any potential
movement to further their own agenda. In such a situation,
Pakistani observers believe that it would be hard to
continue Pakistan’s policy to support the war on terrorism.
Further, a large Pakistani diaspora population lives in
the Middle East—although not in Iraq—and the Pakistani
government is concerned about the adverse impact of any
military operation on this community. Both Pakistan and
India, as net energy importers, are concerned about the
short-term spike in oil prices that any conflict will bring. A
protracted war would lead to an economic downturn in both
states, but Pakistan would face more severe economic
problems because of the fragile state of its economy.
India does not support military intervention because it
has approximately four million citizens working in the
Persian Gulf region, and it fears that a conflict would
endanger the lives and livelihood of this diaspora group.
2

Further, the Indian government traditionally has
maintained strong ties with the government in Baghdad:
Indian military personnel have trained Iraqi officers since
the early 1960s; hundreds of thousands of Indians have
worked in Iraq; and the Indian government has maintained
strong links with the Baathist government in Baghdad
because of its secular credentials.
There is also the concern that any military operation
would be viewed as being anti-Muslim rather than antiSaddam. Participating in the war effort could lead to
sectarian violence in India as sections of India’s Muslim
community (which is over 120 million people) may protest
the government’s decision to participate in the war.
A unilateral use of force by the United States would
cause concern in India since it believes that multilateralism
should be the bedrock of a post-Cold War international
system. A use of force against Baghdad which is not
sanctioned by the United Nations would, therefore, lead to a
formal Indian expression of concern. At the same time,
however, the long-range benefits of a U.S.-Indian strategic
relationship, coupled with the possible fallout of a war, will
see New Delhi continue to push for a closer relationship
with Washington.
Such a maturing of the relationship would be aimed at
strengthening the joint efforts against the war on terrorism,
enhancing India’s military capability, and, possibly,
reacting to the military lessons of an Iraq war.
Counterterrorism and South Asia.
Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India remain important
allies in the war against terror. The recent arrest of Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed suggests that the war on terror is
succeeding, as Pakistan is permitting American law
enforcement and security agencies to assist in tracking
suspected al-Qaeda within the country.
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The CIA and the FBI are providing training and
equipment to Pakistani police and agents as part of their
efforts to apprehend al-Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Justice
Department, for its part, has allocated $73 million to boost
Pakistan’s border security. The program will provide
all-terrain vehicles, Apache helicopters, and radio
communication equipment, in addition to training for
provincial and tribal police and army troops.4 Additionally,
Pakistan and the United States are expected to set up a
Joint Working Group on counterterrorism.
The United States-India Counterterrorism Joint
Working Group was established in January 2000. The group
reached the following agreements in counterterrorism
cooperation:

·
·

Broadened their exchange of information and
assessments on the international and regional
terrorist situation;

·

Strengthened intelligence and investigative
cooperation;

·

Qualitatively upgraded and expanded anti-terrorism
training programs for Indian law enforcement
officials;

·

Signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty;

·

Launched a bilateral Cyber Security Forum, with a
wide-ranging program of action to address challenges
of cyberterrorism and information security;

·

Introduced military-to-military cooperation on
counterterrorism to supplement the initiatives of the
U.S.-India Defense Policy Group in this area;
Worked together closely on multilateral initiatives on
terrorism, including on the implementation of UNSC
Resolution 1373;
4

·

·

Initiated dialogue and cooperation in homeland/
internal security, terrorist financing, forensic science,
transportation security and border management;
and,
Taken concrete steps to detect and counter the
activities of individual terrorists and terrorist
organizations of concern to the two countries.5

The joint anti-terrorism efforts with both India and
Pakistan are, therefore, getting increasingly comprehensive and, in the case of Pakistan, have started to yield
satisfactory results.
Impact of a Conflict.
The impact of a new Gulf War on South Asia, and on the
U.S. standing in the region, may well depend on the
duration of the war, its economic impact, and on the possible
use of the war by al-Qaeda to achieve its own objectives. The
prospective role offered to both South Asian countries in a
post-war environment also would determine the attitudes
about the conflict.
The duration of the war would be important because the
longer it continues, and the more bloody the confrontation
gets, the more likely it is to lead to adverse consequences
both for the South Asian countries and, in the short-term,
for the U.S. standing in the region. A short war, or perhaps
even a rapid regime change, would be the best solution for
both South Asian countries since it would mean minimal
disruption in the flow of energy supplies and only a short
term spike in energy prices. A short war would also most
likely prevent a downturn in the economies of the Persian
Gulf countries, thus ensuring that the Indian and Pakistani
diaspora populations would not face unemployment or be
forced to return to South Asia.
The economic impact of a longer duration conflict,
possibly one with higher levels of casualties, would be
5

traumatic for both Pakistan and India. Higher energy costs
would lead to spiraling inflation in both countries and to
demands for terminating further market reforms. The
United States views market reforms as being critical to
Pakistan’s efforts to become a stable economy and, in the
case of India, to develop a stronger economic relationship
with the United States. A longer duration conflict could
potentially force the expatriate communities of both
countries, which provide valuable remittances and hard
currency to India and Pakistan, to lose their jobs or, at the
very least, to see a sizable reduction in earnings as the
economies of the Gulf states weather the consequences of a
drawn out conflict.
The War on Terrorism.
As this is being written, the hunt for al-Qaeda and
Taliban forces continues in Afghanistan. With it comes the
real danger that these organizations could use U.S.
attention being focused on Iraq to wage new terror strikes in
the region. From an Iraqi perspective, terrorist incidents in
South Asia, especially against American troops would
complicate, but not effectively hinder, America’s war effort
against Baghdad. The rise of terrorist attacks must be
expected, therefore, if a war breaks out in the Persian Gulf.
Additionally, Kashmiri terrorist groups based in
Pakistan may use this opportunity to stage spectacular
strikes against Indian civilian and military installations,
thus reigniting the near nuclear conflict situation that
occurred between the two countries in May-June 2002.
Kashmir terrorist groups have been quite successful at
ratcheting up the level of violence in Indian Kashmir
whenever international attention has focused on the region.
Visits by senior administration officials, both from the
Clinton and Bush administrations, typically have been
marked by terrorist actions by Kashmiri groups. And the
Indian government has made it clear that a serious terrorist
attack, one that leads to high casualty levels or has symbolic
6

value like the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian
parliament, will lead to retaliation against Pakistan.
Pakistan, in turn, has signaled that it will not hesitate to
use nuclear weapons in a conflict with India. The longer the
conflict, therefore, the more likely the possibility of tensions
rising in South Asia due to terrorist activities.
India will continue to work with the United States on the
war against terror because the two countries’ interests are
complementary. Eradicating Al-Qaeda and Taliban, both of
whom the Indian government believes have provided
assistance to the Kashmiri insurgency, is in India’s
long-term interests. At the same time, clipping the wings of
both terrorist organizations constrains the efforts of
Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI) to try to
destabilize the Indian political system. India will continue,
regardless of the outcome of the Iraq war, to provide the type
of assistance the United States needs to fulfill its objectives
in the war on terror.
Regional Complications?
A possible concern for U.S. military planners is that a
war in Iraq may trigger a war in South Asia with India,
possibly seeing the diversion of U.S. attention from South
Asia as an opportunity, launching a preemptive strike
against Pakistan to resolve the issue of crossborder
infiltration. India is unlikely to engage in a preemptive war
against Pakistan given the Indian understanding of U.S.
interests in Pakistan and the belief that coercive diplomacy
would better serve to fulfill New Delhi’s interests. India
recognizes that the United States will continue to work
against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan along the border areas
with Pakistan. New Delhi, somewhat reluctantly, will
restrain its actions against Pakistan.
This has to be qualified. If a serious terrorist incident
occurs, like the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian
parliament, then India would be under great domestic
pressure to take appropriate military action against
7

Pakistan. But if the current situation continues, India
would prefer to exercise coercive diplomacy—the threat of
going to war—to get the United States to rein in the
Pakistani government—just as the Bush administration
did in June 2002 when it pressured General Musharraf to
stop state supported infiltration into Indian Kashmir.
Participation in Coalition Efforts.
Both countries have adopted a neutral position on the
Iraq crisis, and the Indian government has gone as far as to
suggest that it supports a continuation of the UN sanctions
and weapons inspection approach to dealing with the
problem. Once a war breaks out, however, the attitude of the
both governments may change due to the events on the
ground. The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by
Iraq, particularly against the civilian populations of the
Gulf states, would see both countries provide humanitarian
assistance to the affected countries. It would also remove
the constraints placed by domestic constituencies on
intervention because co-religionists were being targeted
with such attacks.
Even then, however, it is unlikely that either country
would exercise the initiative to participate militarily in the
war. The fear of the military situation deteriorating along
the India-Pakistan border would remain in the calculations
of both countries. A more practical constraint would emerge
from the limited mobility of both armed forces. The Indian
Navy can stay at sea for less than a month. The Indian Air
Force does not have an aerial refueling capability. Thus, by
the time any forces were placed on the ground, the war could
well be over.
Post-War Reconstruction.
The most likely area where both countries would be
willing to participate would be in post-war reconstruction.
India’s role would be more significant than Pakistan’s
because of its large pool of educated personnel and its
8

long-standing ties to the Iraqi government. At the root of
any such analysis is the extent to which regime change will
take place in Iraq and the willingness of the United States to
commit time and resources to this endeavor. If the U.S. goal
is to bring about a total societal change, as was the case in
post-World War II Germany and Japan, then it will require
the de-Baathification of the country, a restructuring of
government machinery, and purging and retraining of the
military and police forces. India, particularly, could play a
role in the post-war reconstruction effort in the following
ways.
First, if there is a major health crisis in Iraq, Indian
medical teams could provide the type of assistance required
for the country to recover from a longer duration conflict.
UN estimates of a worst-case scenario health crisis are that
up to ten million people may be affected in a conflict.6 Even if
one places a conservative estimate and reduces this number
to a tenth of the figure cited, it will still be a significant
humanitarian crisis. The Indian government would not
view its position of neutrality as being compromised by
carrying out such an action.
Second, Indian military and police personnel could
assist in the retraining of the Iraqi armed forces and police.
If successful democratization is to take place in Iraq, the
armed forces and police will have to be made into
professional forces that respect the rule of law and recognize
constitutional limitations. The Indian armed forces, with
their long and strong tradition of honoring civilian
supremacy over the military, would serve as ideal trainers
of a new Iraqi army. They could also provide the peace
enforcement capability that post-war Iraq will require.
Indian assistance would be welcome since it would be more
acceptable to the general Iraqi populace than an American
force commitment to carry out these objectives. Indian
forces could also remain for a longer period in Iraq, thus
freeing American troops for operations elsewhere.
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Implications for Long-Term U.S. Strategy and
Standing.
Both India and Pakistan view the United States as their
long-term partner in both security issues and economic
development. Of the two relationships, the one with India is
likely to be more significant since it will be based on a range
of economic, political, and military concerns.
The Indian government is carrying out market reforms,
pursuing a foreign policy complementary to American
interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and attempting
to develop a new military relationship with the United
States. The latter goal, if brought to fruition, will see greater
sales of armaments and weapons technology to India. There
is also a push to have joint operations particularly in the
maritime sphere. Additionally, the U.S. position in the war
on terror has had significant benefits for India. The Bush
administration, in May-June 2002, successfully pressured
the Pakistani government to halt cross-border infiltration of
militants into Indian Kashmir. Another strategic interest of
the two countries that coincides is preventing the
proliferation of WMD.
The Indian government views itself as a responsible
state and, consequently, refuses to transfer WMD
technology to other countries. India also believes that its
regional security environment has deteriorated because of
the transfer of WMD technology from China to Pakistan, as
well as the transfer of ballistic missiles to Islamabad from
both Pyongyang and Beijing. The Indian government
would, therefore, view with concern an overt development of
the Iraqi WMD program since it could mean illegal transfers
to state and nonstate actors. The banned Lashkar-e-Taiba,
which seeks a violent solution to the Kashmir issue, has, for
instance, claimed that the group allegedly had control over
two nuclear weapons.
The military lessons of the war, both offensive and
defensive, will also shape Indian thinking on how to direct
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the emerging relationship with the United States. U.S.
offensive measures will lead to a demand from the Indian
military and government to get the types of technology that
made such efforts successful. Offensively, India is already
expecting to test a 3000-kilometer range ballistic missile by
the end of the year. The war would certainly provide an
incentive for India to develop its nuclear forces but would
not lead to a major, and rapid, push for conventional force
modernization. India’s concerns remain Pakistan and the
deterrence of a Chinese attack in the Himalaya. In both
cases, Indian force levels are sufficient to achieve its
military objectives.
Defensively, if the Iraqis use WMD, India will press the
Bush administration for assistance in getting the Arrow
ABM system, as well as any other civil defense and
countermeasures that the United States may employ to
protect troops and civilians. From the Indian perspective, a
use of WMD could be replicated by Pakistan supported
insurgents in India. While this may be an exaggerated fear
with respect to nuclear weapons, it may be more credible in
the case of biological or chemical weaponry—although the
Indians would point to Pakistan’s transfer of nuclear
technology to North Korea as an example of how even the
nuclear taboo is being broken by Islamabad.
For India, therefore, the Iraq conflict will not change
what is a serious move to consolidate and build upon the
goodwill generated by the Clinton and Bush administrations in making overtures toward that country.
Pakistan, similarly, will continue to welcome U.S.
interest. The short-term economic stabilization of Pakistan
that followed the September 11, 2001, attacks has been
implemented due to the help provided by the United States
and other western nations. Pakistan’s military rulers
recognize that any moves towards long-term stabilization of
the economy will require continued western assistance and
goodwill. Iraq, in that sense, will not impact significantly on
the relationship. Pakistan recognizes its limited leverage
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with the United States comes from the ability to capture or
neutralize Taliban and al-Qaeda elements. It will not,
therefore, rock the boat on the issue of Middle East politics.
Pakistan’s economic problems, therefore, serve as an
incentive for Islamabad to toe the American line.
Moreover, some Pakistanis believe that Iraq provides an
opportunity for Pakistan to reap economic benefits. They
point out that if anti-western sentiments rise because of a
Gulf war, then Arab investors, out of a sense of anger, may
put money in Pakistani banks. This is an optimistic
assessment and unlikely to happen because of the
precarious state of the Pakistan economy.
An alternative scenario is one where the United States
has a diminishing interest in the region. This could be
caused by a downsizing of forces after an Iraq conflict as the
administration attempts to shift resources from military
expenditure to stimulate the economy. It could also happen
if a major victory in the war on terror—the capture of Osama
bin Laden or compelling evidence that he is dead—occurs.
But even if there is a lowering of interest, a change in the
U.S. perception of India and Pakistan is unlikely. The Bush
administration will push ahead with its plans to develop a
stronger relationship with India, and it will also remain
engaged, at the very least economically, with Pakistan.
In conclusion, the principal South Asian countries view
the conflict with Iraq as one that could hurt their economies
and complicate their domestic political situations. This has
led both India and Pakistan to oppose the use of force to
resolve the dispute with Iraq. Both countries, however,
believe that they can play a role in post-war democratization. They also view a stronger long-term relationship with
the United States as desirable and, therefore, will not
connect events in the Gulf to these bilateral relationships.
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